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Machina & Schmeidler (1992) show that probabilistic sophistication can be obtained
in a Savage setting without imposing expected utility by dropping Savage's axiom P2
(sure-thing principle) and strengthening his axiom P4 (weak comparative probabil-
ity). Their stronger axiom, however, embodies a degree of separability analogous to
P2. In this note, we obtain probabilistic sophistication using Savage's original axiom
P4 and a weaker analog of Savage's P2.
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1 Introduction
In subjective expected utility theory, an agent's preferences under uncertainty can
be represented by the expectation of a utility function with respect to the subjective
probabilities that represent the individual's beliefs. Savage (1954) axiomatized this in
a setting of purely subjective uncertainty. Machina & Schmeidler's (1992) contribu-
tion is to provide axioms that continued to characterize beliefs by means of subjective
probabilities, but neither assumed nor implied that risk preferences conformed to ex-
pected utility theory. In particular, they drop Savage's sure-thing principle (axiom
P2) and strengthen his comparative-probability axiom (P4). They motivate the need
to dispense with P2 by noting that \probabilistically sophisticated non-expected util-
ity preferences" { for example, those that can accommodate the Allais paradox { do
not satisfy P2.
All preferences over acts that satisfy the Machina-Schmeidler axioms, however,
induce preferences over lotteries that respect rst-order stochastic dominance. We
show that any such preferences over acts must satisfy a weaker version of P2 we call
the \two-outcome sure-thing principle" (P20), which indeed can be interpreted as a
notion of stochastic monotonicity for acts. We show that the conjunction of P20 and
Savage's original weak comparative-probability axiom P4 is equivalent to Machina
and Schmeidler's stronger comparative-probability axiom. Hence, relying on their
result enables us to show that, imposing the original Savage axioms but weakening
P2 to P20 guarantees probabilistic sophistication.
Machina and Schmeidler (1995) characterize probabilistically sophisticated pref-
erences in an Anscombe-Aumann (1963) setting, by replacing the expected utility hy-
pothesis with a new replacement axiom. Grant and Polak (2006) obtain probabilistic
sophistication in this setting by replacing the Machina-Schmeidler replacement axiom
with an axiom similar to Savage's P4 in conjunction with a stochastic monotonicity
axiom. The current paper demonstrates that results very similar to those of Grant
and Polak (2006) can be obtained in a Savage setting.
Section 2 introduces the notation, Machina and Schmeidler's (1992) rendering of
Savage's theory, and their representation result. In Section 3 we introduce our alter-
native axiom and representation result. Section 4 discusses the relationship between
the results of the current paper and those of Sarin and Wakker (2000) who also use




Let X be an arbitrary set of outcomes (nite or innite). Assume that uncertainty
is described by a set of states, S. For any event E  S, let Ec denote its complement
in S.
Let F denote the set of functions from S to X with nite range, i.e. F is the set
of Savage acts. Furthermore, for any pair of acts f and g in F and any event E  S,
h = [f on E; g on Ec] denotes the act in F formed from `splicing' and `recombining'
the two acts f and g in such a way that h (s) equals f (s) if s 2 E, and equals g (s)
if s 2 Ec.
Let % denote the individual's weak preference relation on F (where, as usual, 
denotes strict preference and  denotes indierence). With slight abuse of notation,
x denotes the constant act h, where h (s) = x for all s 2 S. Hence we will write x % y
if and only if [x on S] % [y on S].
Denote by L the set of probability measures on X with nite supports. We will
refer to the elements of L as roulette lotteries or just as lotteries. For each x in X ,
let x denote the (degenerate) lottery that yields the outcome x with probability one.
Any lottery R in L may be expressed as a probability weighted mixture of degenerate
lotteries, corresponding to the outcomes in its support: that is, R =
Pm
i=1 pixi , where
pi = R (xi) for each i = 1; : : : ;m.
Let 1 (respectively, >1) denote the partial ordering over roulette lotteries of weak
(respectively, strict) rst-order stochastic dominance derived from %. It is dened as
follows: for any pair of lotteries R =
Pm
i=1 pixi and R
 =
Pm





qj for all z 2 X .
And R >1 R, if, in addition, strict inequality holds for some z 2 X .
We shall refer to a preference relation dened on L and denoted by L as risk
preferences. We shall say the risk preferences satisfy stochastic monotonicity (with
respect to %) if they respect the partial ordering of rst-order stochastic dominance,
that is, R 1 R implies R %LR and R >1 R implies R L R. We say that
a function V : L ! R is mixture continuous and stochastically monotonic if it is
continuous in probability mixtures and R >1 (1) R implies V (R) > () V (R).
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Furthermore, we say it is ane if for any pair of roulette lotteries R and R in L,
and any  in (0; 1), V (R+ (1  )R) = V (R) + (1  )V (R).
Subjective Expected Utility
A preference relation % on F is said to admit a subjective expected utility rep-
resentation, if there exists a unique subjective probability measure  (:) over events
and an ane utility function U (:) on L such that, for all pairs of acts f = [x1 on
A1; : : : ;xm on Am] and g = [y1 on B1; : : : ; yn on Bn],













We follow Machina and Schmeidler's (1992) rendering of Savage's theorem. The
following set of axioms is necessary and sucient for a preference relation to admit
a Subjective Expected Utility representation.1
Axiom P1 (Ordering): The relation % is complete, reexive and transitive.
Axiom P2 (Sure-Thing Principle) For all events E and acts f , f , g and h,
[f  on E; g on Ec] % [f on E; g on Ec]
) [f  on E; h on Ec] % [f on E; h on Ec] .
An event E is \null" if any pair of acts that dier only on E are indierent.
Axiom P3 (Eventwise Monotonicity) For all non-null events E, outcomes x
and y, and acts g,
[x on E; g on Ec] % [y on E; g on Ec], x % y.
Axiom P4 (Weak Comparative Probability) For all events A and B,and out-
comes x  x and y  y,
[x on A; x on Ac] % [x on B; x on Bc]
) [y on A; y on Ac] % [y on B; y on Bc] .
Axiom P5 (Nondegeneracy) There exist outcomes x and y such that x  y.
1Savage also has a state-wise dominance axiom (P7) but it is not needed in this setting in which
every act has nite range.
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Axiom P6 (Small Event Continuity) For all outcomes x and acts f  g, there
exists a nite set of events fA1; : : : ; Ang forming a partition of S such that
f  [x on Ai; g on Aci ] and [x on Ai; f on Aci ]  g, for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng .
The rst and last axioms are analogous to the standard ordering and continuity
axioms in choice under certainty. The fth axiom simply requires the individual not
be indierent between all outcomes. The fourth axiom allows us to deduce from
the agent's preferences over simple bets an induced relative likelihood relation over
events. We shall see below that the third axiom is necessary for the induced risk
preferences to satisfy rst-order stochastic dominance.
As Machina and Schmeidler observe, P2may be viewed as being \expected utility-
based". That is, not only does it play a critical role in ensuring that beliefs can be
represented by a unique subjective probability measure but it also entails that the
induced risk preferences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern ane utility
function.2 The aim of Machina and Schmeidler (1992) was to investigate whether it
was possible to have the former and without necessarily entailing the latter.
Suppose we x a probability measure  over events, then we can associate with




i=1  (Ai) xi , that
is, the lottery formed by taking the  weighted average of the degenerate lotteries
corresponding to the outcomes in the range of f .
Probabilistic sophistication means that there exists a unique subjective probability
measure  dened over the set of events, such that the individual ranks any pair of
acts only on the basis of the lotteries they induce through . Formally:
Probabilistic Sophistication A preference relation % on F is said to be proba-
bilistically sophisticated if there exists a unique subjective probability measure
 () over events such that for all pairs of acts f and g, if Rf= Rg then f  g.
If an agent is probabilistically sophisticated, we can construct her induced risk
preferences as follows: for any pair of lotteries R and R, we set R %LR if there
exists a pair of acts f % g such that R = Rf and R= Rg . Furthermore, if an agent
is probabilistically sophisticated then knowledge of an individual's subjective beliefs
2Karni (1985) points out that Substitution only ensures that the risk preferences are state inde-
pendent. But this does not preclude the utility functions being state-dependent. A richer framework
is required to achieve an unambiguous separation of beliefs from potentially state-dependent utility.
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 and her risk preferences %L enables us to recover her entire preference relation over
acts.
Assume that the agent's induced preferences over lotteries (her risk preferences)
can be represented by a (not necessarily ane) function V (:). Then probabilistic
sophistication (with respect to ) is equivalent to:3 for any pair of acts f and g,









If we further assume that the agent's preferences satisfy P2 then her risk preferences
would satisfy the independence axiom of expected utility theory and hence %L would
admit an expected utility representation. Hence in their axiomatization of subjective
probability, Machina and Schmeidler (1992) drop P2, but they need to strengthen
P4.
Axiom P4* (Strong Comparative Probability) For all pairs of disjoint events
A and B, outcomes x  x and y  y, and acts g and h,
[x on A; x on B; g on (A [B)c] % [x on A; x on B; g on (A [B)c]
) [y on A; y on B; h on (A [B)c] % [y on A; y on B; h on (A [B)c] .
Any probabilistically sophisticated agent whose preferences satisfy stochastic mono-
tonicity must satisfy this axiom. For such an agent, the rst preference indicates
 (A)   (B), which in turn implies the second preference.
Like Savage's P4, Machina and Schmeidler's P4* stipulates that the relative
likelihood assessments of the disjoint events A and B are invariant to the prizes
directly used in the bet. But Machina and Schmeidler's axiom is stronger. First,
it applies directly to conditional relative likelihoods; in particular, to the relative
likelihood of the events A and B conditional on the event A[B. Second, it imposes an
additional invariance: these conditional relative likelihood assessments are invariant
to the outcomes that obtain on the states outside of A and B. In Savage, both
conditioning and this invariance are derived from P2 (the sure-thing principle). This
suggests that weakening P2 in a suitable way should be sucient. We do this in the
next section by weakening P2 to an appropriate concept of stochastic monotonicity
for acts.
3In fact, Machina and Schmeidler (1992) state their denition of probabilistic sophistication in
terms of the representation V (). We favor working with a denition stated purely in terms of
preference as the concept of probabilistic sophistication is logically independent of whether or not
the preferences admit a functional representation.
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3 Probabilities via Stochastic Monotonicity.
We rst consider two implications of stochastic monotonicity for risk preferences, and
then extend these ideas to preferences over acts. Let %L be a risk preference relation
on the lotteries over X . Stochastic monotonicity for %L may be expressed in terms
of basic substitution operations on lotteries. One basic substitution is to take an
outcome in the support of a lottery and change it to a worse outcome. Stochastic
monotonicity says we should prefer the lottery before this change.
Stochastic Monotonicity (I) For all x; y 2 X , all  2 (0; 1], and all R 2 L
x  y , x + (1  )R  y + (1  )R. (1)
Another basic substitution is to move a probability mass from a better to a worse
outcome within the support of a roulette lottery. Again Stochastic monotonicity says
we should prefer the lottery before this change. Put another way: if any two roulette
lotteries dier only in the weight they assign to just two outcomes, the agent should
prefer the lottery that puts the larger weight on the better outcome.
Stochastic Monotonicity (II) For any pair of outcomes x; y 2 X , if two roulette
lotteries R;R 2 L have the property that R(z) = R(z) for all z =2 fx; yg,
then
R+ (1  )R % R + (1  )R
) R+ (1  ) R̂ % R + (1  ) R̂ (2)
for all R; R̂ 2 L and  2 (0; 1].
Notice that, in expression (2), R and R dier only in the probability they assign to
x and y. Similarly R + (1  )R and R + (1  )R and R + (1  ) R̂
and R + (1  ) R̂ also dier only in the probability they assign to x and y.
Furthermore R assigns more weight than R to the better outcome if and only if
R + (1  )R (respectively, R + (1  ) R̂) assigns more weight than R +
(1  )R (respectively, R + (1  ) R̂) to the better outcome.
Both these stochastic monotonicity axioms resemble the independence axiom in
that they preserve preference ordering under the substitution of (sub-)lotteries. But
these axioms only involve lotteries that dier just on two outcomes. This is a con-
siderable weakening in that all risk preferences that respect rst-order stochastic
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dominance satisfy both these axioms, regardless of whether or not they satisfy inde-
pendence.
The two stochastic monotonicity axioms are equivalent if the risk preference %L
is continuous. However, their analogs for acts are not equivalent, so we will impose
them separately.
Savage's axiom P3 (eventwise monotonicity) is an analog of stochastic mono-
tonicity (I) for acts. To see the analogy, let g = [z on E, z1 on E1; : : : ; zn on En].
Suppose the agent's probability assessments are given by . Then the terms [x on E;
g on Ec] and [y on E; g on Ec] in the statement of the axiom reduce to the lotteries
 (E) [x] +
Pn
i=1  (Ei) zi and  (E) [y] +
Pn
i=1  (Ei) zi , similar to the terms on
the right side of expression (1). Therefore, if a probabilistically sophisticated agent
satises stochastic monotonicity (I), she must satisfy P3 (eventwise monotonicity).
The following is an analog of stochastic monotonicity (II) for acts. It restricts the
sure-thing principle to apply only if, other than for two outcomes, if one of the acts
in question assigns an outcome to a state then the other act in question assigns that
same outcome to that state.
Axiom P20 (Two-Outcome Sure-Thing Principle) For all events E, all out-
comes x and y, and any acts f; f; g and h, if for all states s and for every
outcome z =2 fx; yg, f (s) = z if and only if f  (s) = z, then
[f on E; g on Ec] % [f  on E; g on Ec] ) [f on E; h on Ec] % [f  on E; h on Ec] .
(3)
To see the analogy to stochastic monotonicity (II), suppose the agent's probabil-
ity assessments are given by . The implication trivially follows if E is null or its
complement is null, so suppose  (E) 2 (0; 1) and suppose f = [z1 on A1; : : : ; zm on
Am], f
 = [z1 on B1; : : : ; z

n on Bn], g = [x̂1 on C1; : : : ; x̂m̂ on Cm̂] and h = [ŷ1 on





i=1  (Ai \ E) zi ] , R = 11 (E)
Pm̂




j=1  (Bj \ E) zj
i
, R̂ = 11 (E)
Pn̂
k̂=1  (Dk̂ \ Ec) ŷk̂ .
Hence the reduction of [f on E; g on Ec] is  (E)R+ [1   (E)]R and the reduc-
tion of [f  on E; g on Ec] is  (E)R+ [1   (E)]R. Similarly, the reduction of
[f on E; h on Ec] is  (E)R+ [1   (E)] R̂ and the reduction of [f  on E; h on Ec]
is  (E)R+ [1   (E)] R̂. Now suppose that, in each state, f(s) and f  (s) dier
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only if they assign the outcomes x or y. Then the `conditional' reductions R and R
dier only in the probabilities they assign to x and y. Therefore, if a probabilisti-
cally sophisticated agent satises stochastic monotonicity (II), she must satisfy the
two-outcome sure-thing principle.
The following lemma provides a useful reformulation of the two-outcome sure-
thing principle.
Lemma 1 AxiomP20 is equivalent to the following statement: For all disjoint events
A and B; outcomes x and x, and acts g and h,
[x on A; x on B; g on (A [B)c] % [x on A; x on B; g on (A [B)c]
implies
[x on A; x on B; h on (A [B)c] % [x on A; x on B; h on (A [B)c] :
Proof. Assume that P20 holds. Consider any pair of disjoint events A and
B, any pair of outcomes x and x, and any pair of acts g and h. Set f :=
[x on A; x on B; g on (A [B)c] and f := [x on A; x on B; g on (A [B)c]. If
f % f , then the premises of P20 are satised for E = A [ B, and the desired prefer-
ence follows.
Now assume that the statement in the lemma holds. Consider any event E, out-
comes x and y, and acts f; f; g and h such that, for all states s and for every outcome
z =2 fx; yg, f (s) = z if and only if f  (s) = z. Suppose that [f on E; g on Ec] %
[f  on E; g on Ec]. Let F = fs 2 E : f (s) = f  (s)g. For each s 2 EnF , both
f (s) and f  (s) are one of the two outcomes x and y, and f (s) = x if and only if
f  (s) = y. Hence, there exist two disjoint events A;B, A [B = EnF , such that
[f on E; g on Ec] = [x on A; y on B; g on (A [B)c]
and
[f  on E; g on Ec] = [y on A; x on B; g on (A [B)c] ,
where g (s) = f (s) = f  (s) for s 2 EnF and g (s) = g (s) for s 2 Ec. Now, the
statement in the lemma implies
[x on A; y on B; h on (A [B)c] % [y on A; x on B; h on (A [B)c] ,
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where h (s) = f (s) = f  (s) for s 2 EnF and h (s) = h (s) for s 2 Ec. Note that
the expression on the left reduces to [f on E; h on Ec] and the one on the right to
[f  on E; h on Ec], which ends the proof. 
While the original formulation of P20 illustrates its relationship to P2, the above
restatement exposes its close connection with P4*, which is the subject of the next
proposition.
Proposition 2 A preference relation% satises strong comparative probability (P4*)
if and only if it satises the two-outcome sure-thing principle (P20) and weak
comparative probability (P4).
Proof. P4 is the restriction of P4* to A [ B = S and P20 is the restriction of
P4* to y = x and y = x.
To show the if part, consider two disjoint events A and B, outcomes x  x and
y  y, and an act g such that
[x on A; x on B; g on (A [B)c] % [x on A; x on B; g on (A [B)c] .
From lemma 1, we have that P20 implies that [x on A; x on B; x on (A [B)c]
% [x on A; x on B; x on (A [B)c], andP4 implies [y on A; y on B; y on (A [B)c]
% [y on A; y on B; y on (A [B)c]. Now, for any act h, invoking lemma 1 we
have that P20 implies the desired preference [y on A; y on B; h on (A [B)c] %
[y on A; y on B; h on (A [B)c]. 
We can now give an alternative characterization of probabilistically sophisticated
beliefs, by replacing P4* with the conjunction of P20 and P4 in Machina and Schmei-
dler's (1992) representation result.
Corollary 3 The following two statements are equivalent:
(a) The preference relation % on F satises ordering, the two-outcome sure-
thing principle, eventwise monotonicity, weak comparative probability,
non-degeneracy and small event continuity.
(b) There exists a unique nitely-additive convex-ranged probability mea-
sure  dened over subsets of S and a non-constant, mixture continuous,
stochastically monotonic function V on L, such that for all pairs of acts f
and g in F










4 Sarin and Wakker
Sarin and Wakker (2000) derive a more-likely-than relationship over events in the
following way: for any A;B  S, A %l B if and only if there exist two outcomes
x  y such that [x on A; y on Ac] % [x on B; y on Bc]. For a probabilistically
sophisticated agent whose subjective beliefs are given by , A %l B if and only if
 (A)   (B), i.e.  is an agreeing probability measure for %l. Machina and
Schmeidler (1992) observe, however, that the existence of such an agreeing probability
measure does not guarantee probabilistic sophistication. Sarin and Wakker (2000)
show that the following axiom is sucient to close the gap, and is also necessary if
we require the risk preferences to satisfy stochastic monotonicity.
Cumulative Dominance (Sarin and Wakker [2000]) f % g whenever fs 2 S : f (s) % xg
%l fs 2 S : g (s) % xg for all outcomes x, where the preference between f and
g is strict whenever one of the antecedent %l orderings is strict (l).
Sarin and Wakker use cumulative dominance in conjunction with the following
weakening of P2 (and of P20) to obtain an alternative characterization of probabilis-
tically sophisticated beliefs.
Axiom P2* (Sarin and Wakker [2000]) For all outcomes x  y and eventsA;B;H
with A \H = B \H = ? :
[x on A; y on Ac] % [x on B; y on Bc] if and only if
[x on A [H; y on (A [H)c] % [x on (B [H) ; y on (B [H)c].
Theorem 4 (Sarin and Wakker [2000]) Assume Savage's (1954) P1, P3, P5,
and P6. Then the following two statements are equivalent.
(a) Probabilistic sophistication holds and the risk preferences satisfy stochastic
monotonicity.
(b) P2* and cumulative dominance hold.
Thus, to obtain their representation result, Sarin and Wakker use a weaker version
of our sure-thing principle together with cumulative dominance, which is closely re-
lated to the stochastic monotonicity of risk preferences. Recall that we also appealed
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to stochastic monotonicity to motivate our axioms. It is natural then to ask what is
the relation of our `new' axioms to those of Sarin and Wakker (where by `new' we
mean dierent from Machina and Schmeidler).
The next proposition shows that the conjunction of Sarin and Wakker's P2* and
cumulative dominance axiom implies the conjunction of our P20 and P4. But, as a
counter example shows, the reverse implication does not hold. Thus our new axioms,
though closely related to Sarin and Wakker's new axioms, are weaker.
Proposition 5 If the preference relation % satises P2* and cumulative dominance
, then it satises P20 and P4.
Proof. Assume that the preference relation % satises P2* and cumulative dom-
inance . Sarin and Wakker (2000) note that the restriction of cumulative dominance
to two-outcome acts gives us P4. We will show that P20 holds by using its equiv-
alent formulation given in Lemma 1. Consider two disjoint events A and B, two
outcomes x and y, and an act g. Assume, without loss of generality, that x % y and
suppose that [x on A; y on B; g on (A [B)c] % [y on A; x on B; g on (A [B)c].
We shall show below that A %l B if and only if [x on A; y on B; h on (A [B)c]
% [y on A; x on B; h on (A [B)c] for any act h, yielding the desired preference.
First, note that P2* is a restriction on the derived likelihood relation: for any
events E;F;H with E \H = F \H = ?, we have E %l F if and only if E [H %l
F [H.
Next, for all acts f and outcomes z, dene U (f; z) = fs 2 S : f (s) % zg. Fix an
act h and let f = [x on A; y on B; h on (A [B)c] and f = [y on A; x on B; h on (A [B)c].




for all outcomes z.























= B [ U (h; z). P2*





Cumulative dominance yields f % f if and only if A %l B, the desired statement.

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To see that it is possible for a preference relation to satisfy both P20 and P4, but
not cumulative dominance consider the following example.
Example. Let S = fs1; s2g and X = fa; b; cg. Let u : X  S ! R be a state
dependent utility function dened by the following payo matrix:
u (; ) a b c
s1 4 1 0
s2 2 0 1
Since there are only two states, we can identify each act f with the vector (x1; x2)
where xs := f (s). Consider the preferences% over these acts generated by V (x1; x2) :=
u (x1; s1) + u (x2; s2). Since these preferences are additive across states, they satisfy
P20 (in fact, they satisfy P2). To show that they satisfy P4, rst notice that the
constant acts are ordered a  b  c. Thus P4 is satised provided that (a; b)  (b; a)
if and only if (a; c)  (c; a), which indeed holds. The `more likely than' relation %`
implied by these preferences is: S ` s1 ` s2 ` ;. Cumulative dominance requires
in particular that if fs 2 S : f (s) % xg = fs 2 S : g (s) % xg for all x 2 X , then
f  g. To show that our preferences violate this, consider the two acts f  = (b; c)
and g = (c; b). We have:
fs 2 S : f  (s) % ag = ; = fs 2 S : g (s) % ag
fs 2 S : f  (s) % bg = S = fs 2 S : g (s) % bg
fs 2 S : f  (s) % cg = S = fs 2 S : g (s) % cg
But V (b; c) = 2 > V (c; b) = 0; that is, f   g 
Underlying this example is the fact that cumulative dominance implies the fol-
lowing restricted version of eventwise monotonicity, P3, for the case where constant
acts are indierent: for all outcomes x and y in X , non-null events E and acts g,
[x on E; g on Ec]  [y on E; g on Ec], x  y.
Eventwise monotonicity is a type of state-independence axiom. The intuitive appeal
of cumulative dominance is that it compares acts by comparing the revealed likelihood
of sets on which those acts yield outcomes `at least as good as' each constant act x.
When state independence fails (as in the example above), however, this intuitive
appeal is undermined. Suppose an act yields an outcome y in a particular state.
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Suppose the constant act y (i.e., the act that yields y in every state) is at least as
good as getting x in every state. But, without state independence, it does not follow
that getting y in this particular state is at least as good as getting x in that state.
In the example, the constant act b is indierent to the constant act c, but getting b
in state s1 is strictly better than getting c in state s1 (and vice versa for state s2).
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